

The Effects of Power and Message Variables on Compliance

Timothy R. Levine and Franklin J. Boster

The study investigated the empirical relationships among social power, message behavior, and compliance. A conceptualization of social power from power dependency theory was offered, and two models of the general relations among these constructs were advanced. They included a mediation model and a moderating model. These issues were investigated by having 108 subjects participate in a bargaining experiment where power was controlled by systematically varying each partner's alternatives, and participants' message behavior and outcomes were observed. Although power had non-trivial effects on message behavior, the data were generally inconsistent with the mediation model. The data were consistent with the moderator model which predicted that message effectiveness varies as a function of social power. Implications and limitations of the results are discussed.

Research on compliance-gaining has been plentiful, and several reviews have commented upon the impressive number of convention papers and published articles on the subject (e.g., Boster, 1990; Seibold, Cantril & Meyers, 1985). Yet, the past ten years has seen a decline in the sheer quantity of research on the topic. Further, the authors of virtually every review of this literature have lamented at the lack of substantive conclusions that can be drawn from the extant research. For example, Boster (1990) observed that, "It is indeed ironic that although a surfeit of data has been collected, they may be insufficient to draw firm conclusions" (p. 11), and D. O'Keefe notes that "... the substantive yield from research area is not at all that one might hope" (1990, p. 202).

Although the factors contributing to this apparent lack of "substantive yield" are most likely numerous, most authors agree on at least two of the culprits, the lack of an underlying conceptual or theoretical base, and a preoccupation with methodological issues (Boster, 1990; O'Keefe, 1990; Seibold et al., 1985; Wheelless, Stewart & Barraclough, 1983). Similarly, although proposed remedies are both many and diverse, one in particular is frequently cited—a focus on message outcomes (e.g., Boster, 1990; Seibold et al., 1985; O'Keefe & Shepherd, 1987). In fact, one of the greatest ironies in the compliance-gaining literature is that the issue of compliance (i.e., message effectiveness) has so often been ignored.¹

By studying message effectiveness, some of the most often cited problems with the compliance-gaining literature may be minimized. First, when considering whether or not a given message will gain another's compliance, the issue of social power becomes an obvious concern. Social power provides a useful theoretical basis for the study of compliance gaining (Wheelless et al., 1983). Second, because actually

Timothy R. Levine (Ph.D., 1992, Michigan State University) is Associate Professor of Communication at Michigan State University where Franklin J. Boster (Ph.D., 1977, Michigan State University) is Professor of Communication. The research reported in this manuscript was taken from the first author's dissertation completed under the direction of the second author. The dissertation received the 1992 Outstanding Dissertation Award from the Interpersonal Division of the International Communication Association. Both authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments provided by other members of the dissertation committee, G.R. Miller, Jack Hunter, and Steve McCornack.

assessing compliance requires some form of interactive design, the use of controversial self-report procedures is precluded. Hence, the development of a new method to assess compliance may overcome some of the methodological limitations evident in the literature.

The current study seeks to examine the effects power and message content on success in gaining compliance. Competing models of power and compliance-gaining will be explicated and tested. Specific effects of power on message behavior, power on outcomes, and message behavior on outcomes will also be investigated. This investigation begins with a discussion of theoretical approaches to the concept of power.

Social Power

The concept of power is of crucial importance to the understanding of how persons gain the compliance of others. Wheelless et al. (1983), for example, argue that power is the potential to influence another's behavior, and compliance gaining is the implementation of that power. From their perspective compliance gaining is power dependent. Thus, the elucidation of power should be a primary concern of compliance gaining researchers.

Similar to other's (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a; 1981b), Wheelless et al. (1983) argue that the primary way in which a person's power, as the potential for exerting influence, is realized is through communication. They discuss a wide variety of compliance gaining tactics that they argue arise from different power bases. Thus, according to Wheelless et al., in order to understand how people gain the compliance of others, one must understand both the concept of power, and the messages used to implement that power.

There exists a great many approaches to conceptualizing power, and they span almost every social scientific discipline (Berger, 1985; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972). Conceptualizations of power, however, can be grouped into two broad-based approaches, power as an outcome and power as a potential.

The former perspective views power as equivalent to social influence (e.g., Dahl, 1957; Kelman, 1961). One is said to have power if one influences another. This approach, however, is tautological (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). Power can be determined only in retrospect. We know someone has power because they influenced someone, they influenced them because they have power.

Alternatively, other students of social power have avoided the tautology by distinguishing power as a potential, capacity, or ability from the implementation of power, and from outcomes such as success in bargaining or compliance gaining (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a; 1981b; French & Raven, 1959; Huston, 1983; Michener & Suchner, 1972; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972; Wheelless et al., 1983). Therefore, it is useful to consider power, the tactics through which power is implemented, and influence as conceptually and empirically distinct constructs.

Thibaut and Kelly (1959) provide a definition of power consistent with this approach. Specifically, they contend that, "... the power of A over B increases with A's ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by B (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959, p. 110). Outcomes are the relative magnitude of rewards and punishments, broadly defined, where the greater the rewards and the less the punishments, the more positive the outcomes.

Thibaut and Kelly's (1959) definition fits nicely within power-dependency theory

(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a; 1981b; Emerson, 1962). Power-dependency theory holds that person A's power over B is determined by B's dependence upon A. Likewise, B's power over A is a function of A's dependence upon B. A person's dependence upon another is, in turn, a function of the availability of alternative outcome sources and the person's commitment to the outcomes. To the extent that B can obtain similar or substitutable outcomes from an alternative source, B is less dependent upon A and hence A has less power over B. Similarly, the less commitment B has to the outcomes obtainable from A, the less dependent B is upon A, and hence the less power A has over B. The amount of commitment refers to the extent to which an outcome is valued, or alternatively, perceived as being important.

Power-dependency theory (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981a) considers both individual and relational power by distinguishing between absolute power and relative power. Absolute power is the power of one party over another irrespective of the other party's power. That is, absolute power is one's dependence on another. Thus, absolute power may be thought of as an individual level power, although it is relationally based. Because power is a function of the other's dependence (i.e., alternatives and commitment), one party's absolute power is independent of the other party's absolute power. In other words, the extent that A is dependent upon B is not necessarily linked to B's dependence upon A.

Relative power, on the other hand, is the ratio of A's dependence on B to B's dependence on A. Both parties' dependence in relation to one another are at issue. Relative power, therefore, applies solely on a relational level.

Given this distinction, it is important to appraise both when considering the role of power in compliance-gaining and bargaining. Intuitively, relative power should be important to success in gaining compliance. To the extent that one party is more powerful than the other party, one would expect the more powerful party to have an advantage over the other in gaining compliance. For example, if B is dependent on A for a desired resource, but A is not dependent upon B, then A could make B's access to the resource contingent upon B complying with A's requests. Person B, however, would not have the same advantage in trying to gain A's compliance. Numerous investigations have found that relatively powerful individuals are more influential than their less powerful counterparts (e.g., Boster et al., 1995; Michener, Vaske, Schleifer, Plazewski, & Chapman, 1975).

When considering equal relative power situations, however, the importance of absolute power becomes more obvious. Specifically, situations in which both parties are highly dependent on one another (i.e., high/high power) are likely to be very different from situations in which neither party is dependent upon one another (i.e., low/low power) in terms of the types of tactics and strategies employed, and in terms of success in gaining the other's compliance. For example, compromise strategies might be used more in the former situation and withdrawal strategies might be used more in the latter situation. Because highly interdependent (i.e., high/high power) individuals have relatively unattractive alternatives, reaching an agreement should be important to them. As neither partner has a distinct advantage in terms of power, striving for a compromise would be a reasonable strategic choice for maximizing outcomes. Conversely, less mutually dependent partners (i.e., low/low power) have more attractive alternatives. If others are reluctant to comply with a request in these situations, a person is likely to pursue an alternative(s) rather than making potentially costly and unnecessary concessions to obtain a compromise.

Power, Communication, and Compliance

Bacharach and Lawler's (1981a, 1981b) treatment of power-dependency theory emphasizes communicative tactics as a mediator of the relationship between power and outcomes. They assert that power tactics are the means through which power is translated into influence. Both absolute and relative power are thought to produce particular tactics and strategies which, in turn, result in influencing or failing to influence another. Thus, according to Bacharach and Lawler, understanding the role of communication is essential to the process of implementing power.

Influence Tactics and Strategies

Over the past twenty-five years many communication scholars have become interested in identifying the types of messages and strategies used to gain compliance. Interest in the types of messages used to gain others' compliance have lead many researchers to develop categorization schemes or typologies of compliance gaining strategies. Perhaps the most widely recognized strategy typology is Marwell and Schmitt's (1967) list of 16 compliance gaining strategies. Subsequently, numerous alternative typologies have been developed (e.g., Cody, McLaughlin & Jordan, 1980; Kearney, Plax, Richmond & McCroskey, 1984, 1985; Wiseman & Schenk-Hamlin, 1981). These lists represent attempts to categorize compliance gaining strategies by message content. Thus, scholars have identified strategies such as altercasting, which involves the agent creating a positive image of the compliant individual or a negative image of the non-compliant individual, or altruism, which involves asking a target to comply for the agent's or some other's benefit.

Other compliance-gaining researchers have examined quantitative dimensions along which compliance-gaining strategies or behaviors may be arrayed. Constructivist researchers have coded strategies according to perspective taking (e.g., Clark, 1979; Clark & Delia, 1976; Delia, Kline, & Burleson, 1979; O'Keefe & Delia, 1979). Alternatively, Boster and Lofthouse (1986) and Instone, Major, and Bunker (1983) have examined agent's persistence in gaining compliance. Persistence refers to the total quantity of message behavior and is measured by the total number of compliance-gaining messages transmitted in a compliance gaining transaction. Additional research by Boster, Levine, and Kazoleas (1993) and Instone et al. have examined subjects' diversity in compliance gaining message behavior. Diversity refers to the variance in message behavior, and is measured by the number of discrete message strategies one employs in an influence situation. Examining quantitative aspects of message behavior in addition to message content has led to some useful advances in understanding how individuals gain the compliance of others (e.g., Boster et al., 1993).

Power and Strategy Use

Central to Bacharach and Lawler's version of power dependency theory is the idea that a person's level of relative and absolute power have a direct impact on the types of messages and strategies used to gain compliance. Relatively little research, however, has investigated this relationship.

Miller (1982) controlled relationship type and relative power. He found that power affects strategy selection, although the effect was moderated by the type of relationship between the parties. In non-interpersonal relationships, as the relative power of the agent increased, the number of compliance gaining strategies selected

increased. In interpersonal situations, the opposite was the case; as the power of the agent increased, fewer strategies were selected.

In another selection study, Howard, Blumstein, and Schwartz (1986) measured dependence and recalled frequency of a relational partner's use of influence strategies. They found that relational partners who were relatively more dependent were perceived to use weaker strategies such as manipulation (e.g., hinting and flattering) and supplication (e.g., pleading and acting helpless). Less dependent partners were perceived as more likely to bully (i.e., use threats).

Boster et al. (1995), in contrast, controlled absolute power and observed actual compliance gaining message behavior. They report that, under some conditions, the absolute power of self and the power of other interacted to affect message content, diversity, and persistence. Taken together, the results of Miller (1982), Howard et al. (1986), and Boster et al. suggest that relative and absolute power of participants affects the types of strategies person's use to gain the compliance of others, although the relationship between power and message selection/behavior is likely to be complex.

Compliance Gaining Messages and Outcomes

Perhaps no issue is as often ignored in compliance-gaining research as the outcomes associated with compliance gaining behavior. With some notable exceptions (e.g., Boster et al., 1993; Spowl & Senk, 1986), compliance-gaining researchers have been content to identify and categorize the types of compliance gaining messages individuals employ or to isolate the antecedents of compliance-gaining message selection or generation. To date we know much more about the type of messages people use and when they use them than we know about when or if these messages are effective. Research on bargaining, however, sheds some light on strategy effectiveness.

Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 1962) found that simply having the ability to affect another's outcomes (i.e., absolute power) and being able to communicate does not insure success in bargaining. Using a trucking game, they varied both power and opportunity to communicate and observed success in bargaining. They found that having absolute power (ability to threaten the other) actually reduced participants' outcomes in the trucking game (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960). Moreover, subjects having the opportunity to communicate, or being required to communicate, were generally not any more successful (and was often less successful) than subjects who were forbidden to communicate (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962), except when coached in effective communication (Krauss & Deutsch, 1966).

Subsequent research on bargaining may help explain the results of Deutsch and Krauss's program of research. Helm, Bonoma, and Tedeschi (1972) and Youngs (1986) report that under conditions of bilateral threat, the use of threats and punishments often trigger conflict spirals. By invoking a norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), subjects using threats and punishments invite retaliatory exchanges, leading to conflict spirals, and reduced effectiveness in bargaining (e.g., see Helm et al., 1972; Youngs, 1986).

Conversely, strategies that encourage cooperation by prescribing the use of reasonable proposals, such as the tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod, 1980a) and the graduated and reciprocated initiative in tension-reduction (GRIT) program (Osgood, 1962), have been found to be successful in encouraging cooperation and maximizing outcomes (e.g., Axelrod, 1980a; 1980b; Oskamp, 1971). By inviting the

reciprocation of cooperative behavior, potentially detrimental spirals may be avoided and constructive spirals are encouraged. Thus, the capacity to retaliate may, if used, lead to conflict spirals and reduced outcomes.

Taken together, these bargaining studies suggest that under conditions of bilateral threat, positively valenced strategies lead to increased cooperation, which, in turn, allows for increased effectiveness. Alternatively, negatively valenced strategies often lead to conflict spirals that adversely affect participants' outcomes. These conclusions are also consistent with research by Spowl and Senk (1986) who found that car salesmen who reported using positive strategies earned greater commissions than those who reported using relatively more negative strategies.

Research Issues

Broadly stated, the goal of the present research is to investigate the relationships among power, message factors, and success in compliance gaining. Recall that Bacharach and Lawler's (1981a) power dependency theory contends that message behavior mediates the relationship between power and success in gaining compliance. Recent research by Boster et al. (1995), however, suggest a rival model, one in which power moderates the relationship between message behavior and outcomes. The current study provides a test of these rival models. In addition, the specific effects of power upon message behavior, power upon success, and message behavior on success are investigated.

Bacharach and Lawler's (1981a) power dependency theory offers a mediational model of the role of power in social influence processes. From this perspective power is thought to affect message behavior which, in turn, impacts success at exerting influence. That is, Bacharach and Lawler argue for a causal string in which the relationship between power and outcomes is indirect. This model is consistent with conceptual work by Wheelless et al. (1983) on the role of power in compliance gaining.

Despite the seemingly intuitive appeal of this model, careful consideration leads one to speculate on the validity of the mediational model. First, the direct link between power message behavior is tenuous. Although power has been shown to effect message selection and behavior (Boster et al., 1995; Howard et al., 1986; Miller, 1982; Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980), why power or perceived power would inherently necessitate or prohibit the use of specific strategies remains unclear. Surely having an ability or potential does not mandate the implementation of that ability. For example, it is unreasonable to assume that just because one has the ability to punish another, one would automatically threaten to do so. Moreover, it is also plausible that one might threaten another even though one does not have the ability to follow through with the threat. In their discussion of power tactics Bacharach and Lawler (1981a) grant this possibility in their discussion of bluffing. Bluffing is inconsistent with this mediational model.

Second, it is plausible that power might have a direct impact on outcomes under some circumstances. For example, given a grossly unequal power balance, the person with relatively more power might well gain the compliance of her less powerful counterpart regardless of what is said. Conversely, someone with relatively little power may find that all strategies are equally ineffective in gaining the compliance of a reluctant powerful other.

Thus, reasons exist to question the validity of mediational model of power and success. Given these arguments, consideration of other models is warranted.

Boster et al. (1995) provide such a rival model. They speculate that rather than messages mediating the effects of power on success, power might moderate the effectiveness of messages. Put differently, specific messages may be more or less effective in securing compliance depending upon the relative and absolute power of the bargainers.

This moderator model is consistent with the research on power and success reviewed above. Recall that research on conflict spirals (e.g., Helm, Bonoma & Tedeschi, 1972; Youngs, 1986) found that under conditions of bilateral threat (i.e., high mutual dependence) the use of threats and punishment strategies are often counterproductive. Under unequal power conditions, however, the weaker party's inability to reciprocate with punishments should avoid potentially detrimental spirals, and threats by the stronger party might well be highly effective. Thus, partner's power may moderate the effectiveness of threat and punishment strategies.

Similarly, under conditions of bilateral threat compromise-based strategies have been found to be highly effective. The utility of compromise strategies, however, may not hold in unequal power situations. Intuitively, unnecessary concessions on the part of the relatively powerful party should lead to decreases in their effectiveness. Again, this reasoning suggests a moderator model of power and influence.

Boster et al. (1995) provided a direct test of these rival models. Boster et al. had 46 subjects engage in a bargaining game similar to one developed by Scudder (1986) in which power was controlled and message content and success were observed. Although their results were not definitive, Boster et al.'s data were generally more consistent with the moderator model.

In summary, the aim of this research is to investigate the empirical relationships among social power, message behavior, and compliance. A conceptualization of social power from power dependency theory was offered. Two models of the general relations among these constructs were advanced. These included a three variable mediational model and a moderating model.

Method

Participants

The participants were 106 undergraduate students enrolled in a variety of communication classes at a large Midwestern university. Fifty males and 56 females participated in the experiment.

Design

This experiment used a 2×2 repeated-measures design with the absolute power (low, high) of each of the two experimental participants as repeated factors. That is, each dyad participated in all four power conditions. The order of the power conditions were counterbalanced and order effects were assessed.²

Consistent with power dependency theory, power was controlled by varying an alternative offer in a bargaining game. Each participant was furnished with an alternative offer that could be accepted at any time. The acceptance of an alternative offer by one participant forced the other participant to accept the alternative offer and ended a given trial. When participants were in a high power condition, their

partners had relatively unattractive alternative offers (thus being more dependent). Participants in low power conditions had partners with attractive alternatives. Alternative offers were assigned so that taking them yielded a less profit than could have been obtained through bargaining, except in the low/low power (i.e., low mutual dependence) condition. The specific alternative offers by power condition are presented in Appendix A.

The Bargaining Game

The bargaining game used was similar to the ones used by Scudder (1986) and Boster et al. (1993). Each participant was randomly assigned to play the role of either a car buyer or a car seller. Each participant bought or sold a total of five hypothetical used cars. For each car, each participant was furnished with a retail (list or sticker) price, the value of the car plus seller profit, a wholesale (invoice) price, the value of the car, and an alternative offer. The difference between the retail and wholesale prices was held constant across conditions. The retail prices, the wholesale prices, and the alternative offers, are presented by condition in Appendix A.

Seller's profit was calculated by subtracting the wholesale price from the agreed upon price and the buyer's profit was calculated by subtracting the agreed upon price from the retail value. Profits were used as a measure of bargaining success.

To motivate the subjects, they were informed that the amount of extra-credit they gained for their participation would vary according to their success in the game. That is, they were told that they could gain extra points to the extent that they did well in the game. All participants actually received the same amount of extra credited. Extra credit was awarded after all data were collected to help maintain the belief in the incentive.

Participants were allowed to send up to five messages each per trial (i.e., per car). If they had not reached an agreement after all the messages had been sent, the trial was ended and both were forced to accept their alternative offers. Each participant bought or sold five hypothetical cars, one practice car and one car corresponding to each power combination, although the participants were led to believe that there would be six cars bought and sold to guard against end effects.

Procedure

Participants were scheduled to arrive at the laboratory in groups of four. When all had arrived, subjects were randomly assigned to bargaining pairs with the constraint of maintaining a relatively equal distribution across sex combinations. Once assigned to pairs, subjects were seated across a table from their partner, and randomly assigned to the role of either buyer or seller.

Subjects were provided with detailed rules for the bargaining game (see Appendix B). All were allowed as much time as needed to read the instructions. When it was obvious that all had finished, the experimenter verbally reinforced the instructions and asked for questions. Once all participants indicated their understanding, a practice trial was completed. After asking a second time for questions the four experimental trials were completed.

At the beginning of each trial each participant was furnished with a "car card" detailing all the relevant information concerning the car to be bought and sold, and a packet of five message sheets. Participants were instructed to write a message on the first message sheet and slide it across the table to their partner. Participants

TABLE 1
TYPES, DEFINITIONS, AND EXAMPLES OF STRATEGY CATEGORIES

1. Altruism—I need your compliance, or help, so accept my offer, i.e., “Do it for me.”
2. Compromise/Negotiation—The bargainer makes a concession in price in order to reach an agreement. The norm of reciprocity may be invoked, e.g., “I’ll give a little, if you will.”
3. Direct request/offer—Make an offer, or ask for a particular price, e.g., “I’ll give you \$6,000 dollars for that car.”
4. Discounting—The price is lowered to make the offer more attractive, e.g., “Ok, I can drop to \$5,500 on this on.”
5. Expertise—An appeal based upon the speaker’s credibility, e.g., “I work on cars a lot, and I know this is a good buy.”
6. Inefficacy—Statements indicating that the speaker has limited bargaining power, e.g., “I can’t afford to go any higher.”
7. Liking—Statements expressing positive sentiment for the other, e.g., “You seem like a nice person, couldn’t you lower the price a bit.”
8. Qualities of the Object—positive or negative features of the car are offered to justify the offer, e.g., “the car has really low millage.”
9. That’s-Not-All—A bonus is included to make the offer more attractive, e.g., “I’ll throw in a new set of tires.”
10. Threat—A statement expressing an intent to end the trial; thus forcing the other to accept the alternative offer, e.g., “this is my final offer.”

alternated messages in this fashion until the given car was bought and sold. After all four experimental trials were completed participants were debriefed, and dismissed.

Stimulus Materials

Before each trial each participant was presented with a “car card.” The car cards were made from 3×5 index cards, and buyers’ and sellers’ car cards were color coded to avoid confusion. Different cards, and hence different cars, were distributed for each practice and experimental condition. Each car card was blank on one side, and had pertinent information printed on the other side. It provided the year, make, model, and relevant options (e.g., air conditioning, sun roof, etc.) of a particular automobile. Each card also presented the retail price, the wholesale price, and the participant’s alternative offer for the vehicle in question. The prices for each experimental car corresponded to the actual bluebook value of the car at the time of the study to increase experimental and mundane realism. Complete descriptions of each car are presented in Appendix C.

Prior to each trial, subjects were also given a packet of five “messages sheets.” Each message sheet was an 8.5 by 3.7 inch piece of paper. Buyer’s and seller’s message sheets were color coded to correspond with the car cards. Each message sheet had the type of car printed in the upper right hand corner, and subject number and message order information in the upper left corner.

Coding

All messages were sent in writing and collected at the end of each trial. The classification for strategy types were adapted from Boster et al. (1995). The 10 strategy types included: altruism, compromise/negotiation, direct request/offer, discounting, expertise, inefficacy, liking, qualities of the object, that’s-not-all, and threat. An “other” category was used for messages that were irrelevant to the negotiation or did not fit within the established categories. Strategy types, definitions, and examples are provided in Table 1.

The participants produced and sent a total of 1067 messages. Each message was

TABLE 2
FREQUENCIES OF STRATEGY USAGE

Strategy	<i>f</i>	Message %	Strategy %
Altruism	31	2.9	1.9
Compromise/Negotiation	485	45.5	29.1
Direct request	450	42.2	27.0
Discounting	14	1.3	0.8
Expertise	6	0.6	0.3
Inefficacy	59	5.5	3.5
Liking	18	1.7	1.1
Qualities of the object	335	31.4	20.0
That's-not-all	86	8.1	5.2
Threat	149	14.0	8.9
Other	35	3.3	2.1

Note: Message percent refers to the percentage of messages containing a given strategy, and strategy percent refers to the percentage of coded responses falling into a particular category.

independently coded for strategy type by two coders who were unaware of the experimental condition or hypotheses. The coding procedure allowed for more than one strategy per message. The coders initially agreed on 97% of the strategies, Kappa = .95. The coders attempted to resolve disagreement through discussion, with the author serving as final arbitrator of unresolved disagreements. This procedure produced 1633 instantiations of message strategies and 35 messages coded as "other." The number of strategies used per message ranged from 1 to 5; $M = 1.56$, $SD = 0.64$. Frequency distributions for each strategy are presented in Table 2.

Each coder also rated each of the 1067 messages for valence on a 5-point scale. The coders agree on 92.7% of the valence ratings, interclass $r(1065) = .78$, $p < .0001$. The mean coder rating was used as the measure of message valence.

Persistence was calculated in two ways. The first measure of persistence, strategy persistence, was calculated by summing the total number of strategies, regardless of type, used on a various trial (i.e., in a given power condition). The second measure of persistence, message persistence, consisted of the total number of message sheets sent by a given subject during a particular trial. Total strategy persistence and total message persistence were calculated by summing the relevant persistence scores across all four power conditions.

Diversity scores equaled the total number of unique strategy types used on a given trial (i.e., the total number of different strategy types used). Total diversity scores were the number of unique strategies used across all four trials. Thus, unlike persistence, total diversity was not an across-trial sum. Both persistence and diversity scores were calculated on the basis of the post-resolution coding.

Results

The data were tested for consistency with the mediational model and the moderating model. The mediational model (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a) predicted that power affects message use which affects success. The moderating model predicted that power would interact with message use to determine success. Tests of the "specific effects" are imbedded within these analyses.

Mediational Model

The power-message link was investigated with a 2 (source power, high/low) by 2 (target power, high/low) repeated-measures ANOVAs for each of the ten strategies.

Significant interactions between agent's power and target's power were found for compromise/negotiation, $F(1, 105) = 8.78, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .17, r = .41$, direct requests/offers, $F(1, 105) = 6.45, p < .01, \eta^2 = .06, r = .24$, and inefficacy, $F(1, 105) = 6.67, p < .01, \eta^2 = .06, r = .24$, strategies. Main effects for target's power were found for threat, $F(1, 105) = 40.02, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .28, r = .53$, in addition to a significant interaction, $F(1, 105) = 8.60, p < .004, \eta^2 = .08, r = .28$. No differences in the use of altruism, discounting, expertise, liking, qualities of object, and that's not all were attributable to power condition. Strategy means by power condition are presented in Table 4.

Examination of Table 4 suggests that compromise/negotiation strategies are more likely to be used in the low relative power condition (i.e., low agent, high target power) and direct requests/offers are used most in cases of high relative power (i.e., high agent, low target power). Inefficacy messages were used less in situations characterized by high interdependence (i.e., high, high power) than in the other power conditions. As might be expected, threats were more likely to be used when target's power low, this being particularly true for the unequal power condition. Although threats were always less likely to be used when the target had high power, this was especially true in the high interdependence condition.

Similar analyses were conducted with strategy persistence, message persistence, diversity, and message valence as the dependent measures. For strategy persistence, there was a statistically significant main effect for target's power, $F(1, 105) = 4.55, p < .035, \eta^2 = .01, r = .09$, and a significant 2-way interaction, $F(1, 105) = 33.14, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .04, r = .19$. Examination of cell means suggests that individuals were more persistent in unequal power conditions than in equal power conditions. Within equal power conditions, individuals were less persistent in the interdependent condition (i.e., high, high power) than in the independent condition (i.e., low, low power). Agent's and target's power interacted to affect message persistence, $F(1, 105) = 33.99, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .04, r = .19$, with the same pattern in means evident. Agent's and target's power also interacted to affect message diversity, $F(1, 105) = 20.84, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .03, r = .17$. Again, the same pattern of means that was observed for the measures of persistence was evident in diversity scores. For message valence, all three components of explained variance were statistically significant; main effect of source power, $F(1, 105) = 608.93, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .29, r = .54$, main effects for target power, $F(1, 105) = 403.03, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .25, r = .50$, and the two-way interaction, $F(1, 105) = 552.87, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .28, r = .53$. Counter to what might be expected, individuals were more negative in the low, high power condition, than in the other power conditions. Cell means for strategy persistence, message persistence, diversity, and message valence are also presented in Table 3.

Next, the link between strategy use and success was explored. The frequency of use for each strategy across conditions, total strategy persistence, total message persistence, total diversity, and total message valence were correlated with total success. No statistically significant correlations resulted (see Table 4).

The data presented thus far are inconsistent with Bacharach and Lawler's (1981a) mediational model. Although the data were consistent with the first link in the model (i.e., power had substantial effects on message behavior), no evidence was found for the second link in the model. Because the final link in the model was not substantiated, the model would predict negligible effects for power on success. If the data

TABLE 3
MEAN STRATEGY USAGE BY POWER CONDITION

Strategy	Power Condition			
	LL	LH	HL	HH
Altruism	.047	.094	.094	.057
Compromise/Negotiation _c	1.019	1.387	1.198	.991
Direct request _c	1.019	1.057	1.170	1.009
Discounting	.019	.047	.019	.047
Expertise	.019	.038	.000	.009
Inefficacy _c	.132	.179	.189	.057
Liking	.057	.047	.028	.038
Qualities of the object	.726	.887	.802	.774
That's-not-all	.255	.208	.208	.142
Threat _{bc}	.481	.274	.623	.094
Strategy Persistence _{bc}	3.726	4.245	4.377	3.236
Message Persistence _c	2.406	2.783	2.774	2.236
Diversity _c	2.858	3.113	3.142	2.509
Message Valence _{abc}	2.983	2.284	2.985	3.004

Note: An “a” denotes a significant main effect for Ss’ power, a “b” indicates a significant main effect for other’s power, and a “c” signals a significant interaction.

were inconsistent with this prediction, the data would be clearly inconsistent with the model.

The effects of power on success were analyzed with a 2 × 2 (agent by target power) repeated measures ANOVA. The results indicated that all three components of explained variation were statistically significant and substantial. The main effect for own power, $F(1, 105) = 72.21, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .06, r = .25$, was significant with subject’s success being greater in high power conditions ($M = 623.7$) than low power conditions ($M = 540.6$). When subjects’ partners were in a low power condition ($M = 461.1$), subjects obtained much greater success than when their partners were in a high power condition ($M = 703.2$); $F(1, 105) = 618.03, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .51, r = .72$. The interaction between agent and target power was also statistically significant, $F(1, 105) = 142.86, p < .0001, \eta^2 = .09, r = .30$. Success was greatest in conditions of low/low power ($M = 711.79, SD = 71.80$) followed by high/low power ($M = 694.63, SD = 100.75$), high/high power ($M = 552.76, SD = 116.97$), and low/high power ($M = 369.43, SD = 99.65$).

These results are clearly inconsistent with the mediational model. Therefore, the mediational model, although it provides some insights, can be rejected.³ Attention is now turned to the moderator model.

TABLE 4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MESSAGE BEHAVIOR AND SUCCESS

Strategy	<i>r</i>	Strategy	<i>r</i>
Altruism	.12	Qualities of object	.12
Compromise/Negotiation	−.01	That's-not-all	−.08
Direct request	−.03	Threat	.07
Discounting	.05	Strategy	.06
		Persistence	
Expertise	.04	Message	−.02
		Persistence	
Inefficacy	.12	Diversity	.10
Liking	−.04	Message Valence	−.02

Note: For all correlations, $df = 104, p = ns$.

The Moderator Model

The moderator model predicts that strategies will be differentially effective in different power conditions. To test this model, the various types and dimensions of message behavior were correlated with success in each of the four power conditions. Fisher's r to z transformations were used to test for differences in association across power conditions.

Only one significant correlation was found in the low mutual dependence (i.e., low-low power) condition. The use of altruism strategies were negatively associated, $r(104) = -.19, p < .03$, with success. This correlation did not differ significantly across power conditions.

In the low agent, high target condition the use of compromise/negotiation strategies were found to be ineffective, $r(104) = -.28, p < .002$. This correlation differed significantly from the correlations observed in the other three power conditions (with low/low, $r = .04, z = 2.36, p < .01$; with high/low, $r = .21, z = 3.60, p < .0001$; with high/high, $r = .07, z = 2.58, p < .005$). Both strategy persistence, $r(104) = -.19, p < .03$, and message persistence, $r(104) = -.25, p < .005$, were also counterproductive. The correlation for strategy persistence differed significantly from the correlation obtained in the high agent/low target ($r = .11, z = 2.40, p < .01$), and the correlation for message persistence differed from the correlations in the low/low condition ($r = .10, z = 2.56, p < .006$) and the high/low condition ($r = .11, z = 2.63, p < .005$). The use of positive messages, however, was strongly related to success. The correlation between message valence and success was $r = .52, p < .0001$. This correlation differed significantly from the correlations observed in the other three power conditions (with low/low, $r = -.02, z = 4.29, p < .0001$; with high/low, $r = .04, z = 3.86, p < .0001$; with high/high, $r = .10, z = 3.43, p < .0001$).

In the high self/low target power condition, only compromise/negotiation strategies were associated with success, $r(104) = .21$. As noted above, this correlation differed from the correlation obtained in the low/high condition. Although not statistically significant, the correlation for diversity, $r(104) = .15, p < .07$, differed from the correlations obtained in the low/low ($r = -.10, z = 1.81, p < .04$) and the low/high ($r = -.14, z = 2.10, p < .02$) power conditions.

No significant correlations were found in the high agent/low target condition, nor did any those correlation vary across power condition except as noted above. See Table 5 for complete results.

These results, although modest, are generally consistent with the moderator model. Coupled with the previous finding of no direct effects of message behavior upon success, these results suggest that those affects that are attributable to message behavior vary as a function of power. Examination of table 5 indicates that most differences occurred between the two unequal power conditions.

Discussion

This research investigated the relationship among power, compliance gaining message behavior, and the actual gaining of compliance. Two models of the global relations among these variables were specified and tested within a negotiation game. The first of these was based upon Bacharach and Lawler and Wheelless et al., and proposed a three-variable causal string (i.e., a mediational model). This model held

TABLE 5
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MESSAGE BEHAVIOR AND SUCCESS BY POWER CONDITION

Strategy	Power Condition			
	LL	LH	HL	HH
Altruism	-.19*	-.07	-.01	-.03
Compromise/Negotiation	.04 _a	-.28 _{abc} *	.21 _b *	.07 _c
Direct request	.01	-.09	-.07	-.07
Discounting	.03	-.05	.04	.00
Expertise	.10	-.09	—	.02
Inefficacy	-.05	-.03	.03	.04
Liking	.04	-.06	-.04	-.06
Qualities of the object	-.02	-.04	.07	.11
That's-not-all	-.12	.05	.01	-.07
Threat	.13	.04	.02	-.04
Strategy Persistence	-.01	-.19 _{de} *	.14 _d	.04 _e
Message Persistence	.10 _f	-.25 _{fg} *	.11 _g	-.03
Diversity	-.10 _h	-.14 _i	.15 _{hi}	.01
Message Valence	-.02 _j	.52 _{kl} *	.04 _k	.10 _l

Note: For all correlations, $df = 104$. A “*” indicates a statistically significant correlation at $p < .05$. Correlations with the same subscript are significantly different at $p < .05$ with a Fisher's r to z transformation. The z values for the significant differences by subscript are: a 2.36, b 3.60, c 2.58, d 2.40, e 1.67, f 2.56, g 2.63, h 1.81, i 2.10, j 4.29, k 3.86 l 3.43.

that power gives rise to specific message strategies which, in turn, produce compliance or noncompliance. The second model was derived from Boster et al.'s (1995) research on bargaining games and simulations. Counter to the mediational model, the this model posited that power moderates message effectiveness. That is, power and message behavior were predicted to interact to affect compliance.

The data were analyzed for consistency with the two proposed models. The data were inconsistent with the three variable mediational model, although the data were consistent with the first link in model. The use of several strategies, and all four dimensions of message behavior, varied significantly between power conditions. No evidence, however, was found for the second link in the model. None of the strategies or dimensions of message behavior were associated with bargaining success.

Two reasons justify rejecting the mediational model. First, because the data provide little evidence for the last link in the models, it fails to account for success. That is, the model does not provide a viable description of how power is translated into influence. This failure severely limits the utility of the mediational model.

Second, subsequent analyses revealed large effects for power on success. This finding is clearly inconsistent with the causal chain hypothesis because power and success are the first and last variables, respectively, in the proposed chain, and the effects of power on success were larger than the effects obtained for the proposed links. Thus, this model not only lacks adequate explanatory power, but also generates predictions that can not be reconciled with the data.

Although the mediational model must be viewed as a failure in its global representation of the influence process, it still provides some important insights concerning social power and message production. The findings consistent with one of the specified paths suggest that power is an important antecedent of message use.

Contrary to the tests of the mediating models, the data were consistent with the moderating model. Although no evidence was found for main effects of message behavior on compliance, certain aspects of message behavior were found to be

effective or counterproductive in certain power conditions. Specifically, the efficacy of the compromise/negotiation strategy and all four dimensions of message behavior varied significantly across some power conditions. Simply put, these findings suggest that some of the messages were effective (or counter-productive) some of the time, but none of the messages were effective all of the time.

Two individual effects of sufficient strength merit discussion. First, power had a profound impact upon success. As predicted, the more powerful partner generally did better regardless of message behavior. By the same token, the less powerful partner was at a clear disadvantage.

In one sense, this finding can be considered an artifact of the design. Because of the way in which power was varied, when subjects were in high power situations, they were all but guaranteed higher outcomes than when in a low power situation. Yet, this artifact likely reflects an actual bias in favor of the powerful. More powerful people are usually more influential because of the nature of social power and all that comes with it, not because of the specific rules of a particular bargaining game. Thus, although the power produces influence finding is attributable to the way in which power was varied, it is likely to be more indicative of actual constraints than of idiosyncrasies in the experimental design.

Perhaps more interesting is the amount of variance in compliance within power conditions. Although the design guaranteed that individuals could obtain a certain level of success in each power condition, in practice it did not always work out that way. Nowhere was this fact more evident than in the low-low power condition. In this condition each participant had attractive alternatives, and hence neither partner was dependent on the other. This condition differed from the others in that it was the only condition in which participants could do better by taking their alternatives (i.e., by not reaching an agreement). Thus, one might reasonably expect no variance in outcomes. Such, however, was not the case. For some reason(s) some subjects settled for lower outcomes than they could have obviously and easily obtained. Perhaps this finding is attributable individual differences in message effectiveness.

The second specific finding that was large was the effect of message valence in the low-high power condition. Overall, there was a general trend for specific strategies to be counterproductive under conditions of low relative power. The clear exception was message valence. Simply using positively toned messages, regardless of type, was the one factor that was clearly advantageous in this condition. Across individuals, being nice was strongly associated ($r = +.52$) with success in the low relative power condition. Somewhat ironically, although using positively valenced messages was significantly more effective in the low-high power condition than in any of the other power conditions, individual's messages were rated as less positive in the low-high condition than any of the other conditions.

The finding that positive messages are effective for the weak fits squarely with the previous research on effective negotiation and conflict spirals. It was argued that message behavior is often reciprocated. The use of positive messages by those in an inferior bargaining position should discourage aggression by their more powerful counterparts, and instead foster cooperative and, ultimately, productive exchanges.

There are several characteristics of the present research design that merit discussion, and have implications for compliance gaining research. The vast majority of compliance gaining studies have subjects either select or generate compliance gaining messages in response to either hypothetical or recalled situations. The

current study differs from this typical research in at least two important ways. First, subjects were actually trying to influence another with real consequences. Second, the target was a real person with goals of his or her own, who responded to the agent's compliance gaining messages.

These differences are important for several reasons. First, the design allowed for success to be observed. As noted earlier, perhaps no issues has been as neglected as that of effectiveness in compliance gaining. The current design, in essence, puts the compliance back into compliance gaining. Expanding the scope of compliance gaining research to consider the consequences of message behavior in addition to its antecedents offers a more complete view of the social influence process.

Second, because there were real consequences attached to subjects' messages, the experimental and mundane realism of the study was enhanced, thereby increasing internal and external validity. Subjects were led to believe that their performance on the task would determine the amount of credit they received for their participation. Moreover, subjects were paired with another whose interests competed with their own, and who might well form various impressions of the subject. Partners not only resisted compliance attempts, but strove to exert influence of their own. These experimental demands tended to make the task both challenging and involving. These demands also mirror the constraints present in actual interpersonal influence situations. Thus, there is reason to believe that the current research design allows for more confidence in the validity of the results than other commonly used research strategies.

Although subjects were required to influence another, some aspects of the experiment were obviously contrived. Specifically, subject did not buy and sell actual cars, nor did any money actually changed hands. One could question if the messages used were similar to the messages the same individuals would use if actually buying or selling an used car. The consequences of making a poor deal were also clearly less extreme in the experimental environment than in the situation the experiment attempted to emulate. Subjects also has less information about the car than they would have had a real car been present. Those features may have limited the viability of appeals based upon qualities of the car.

In addition, subjects communicated with written rather than spoken messages, and one might question the extent that written messages correspond to spoken messages. One would expect written messages to be less spontaneous and more thoughtful than spoken messages, and written messages, because of the effort and processes involved, are also likely to be shorter and linguistically different than spoken messages.

Thus, the data were not entirely naturalistic, and the difference between the experimental task and its natural counterpart may well be important, but, one must address two important issues to assess the worth of the data adequately. First, do the contrived elements of the study change the substantive conclusions drawn from the data? Although they are likely to have affected the values of specific variables in the study, it is less likely that they substantially altered the general relationships observed between variables. Second, one must compare the strengths and weaknesses of the current design to other available research alternatives. Although the current design did not yield entirely natural data, it represents a better proxy than other current procedures. Subjects, after all, were actually attempting to influence another.

A final limitation concerns the generalizability of situation provided. One might question how informative data on buying and selling hypothetical used cars are to other interpersonal influence situations. The situation, for example was likely to limit type of message strategies used. The qualities of object and that's-not-all strategies, for example, might not be used in other contexts. Strategies such as direct requests, threats, and compromise, however, are more general. Yet, again the crucial question is if the particular type of situation used would change the global relationships among variables, and hence alter the substantive conclusions drawn from the results. There are no obvious reasons why it would. Thus, although some of the strategies used might be specific to used cars or product sales in general, the results have implications for most interpersonal influence situations. Specifically, the conclusions that 1) power affects message use, 2) power affects compliance, and 3) power moderates message effectiveness should be generalizable.

In summary, this study sought to investigate the association between power, message behavior, and outcomes. The data suggest that message behavior and power interacted to effect message effectiveness. Although there were several limitations, these general findings may be relevant across most interpersonal influence situations.

Notes

¹We are using the label term "compliance-gaining" to refer to research investigating the types of tactics or strategies subjects select or generate to gain the compliance of others (e.g., Marwell & Schmitt, 1967; Miller et al., 1977). Few studies have measured both strategy selection or generation and message effectiveness. Also, a large number of studies have manipulated message strategies and measured success (e.g., research on the foot-in-the-door strategy, fear appeals, etc.).

²Order effects were investigated with separate 2×2 (subjects' power in the first trial by partners' power in the first trial) independent groups ANOVAs for each strategy type, dimension of message behavior, and success. Main effects for subjects' power were found for the use of direct requests. Direct requests were more common when subjects were initially assigned to a high rather than low power condition, $F(1, 102) = 5.74$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .05$, $r = .22$. Three main effects were detected for others' power. Qualities of objects [$F(1, 102) = 5.16$, $p < .03$, $\eta^2 = .05$, $r = .22$] and threats [$F(1, 102) = 5.61$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .05$, $r = .23$] were used more frequently when partner's initial power was low, and the that's-not-all strategy was used more frequently when partner's initial power was high, $F(1, 102) = 4.55$, $p < .04$, $\eta^2 = .04$, $r = .20$. No statistically significant interactions were obtained, and no order effects of any kind were evident for the other strategies, the dimensions of message behavior, or success.

³A second version of the mediation model predicted that the links between power and message use and message use and success would be further mediated by the perceived power of the agent and target respectively. The data was also inconsistent with this version.

References

- Axelrod, R. (1980a). Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24, 3-25.
- Axelrod, R. (1980b). More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24, 379-403.
- Berger, C.R. (1985). Social power and interpersonal communication. In M. L. Knapp and G. R. Miller (Eds.) *Handbook of Interpersonal Communication* (pp. 439-499). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Bacharach, S.B., & Lawler, E.J. (1981a). *Power, tactics, and outcomes*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Bacharach, S.B., & Lawler, E.J. (1981b). Power and tactics in bargaining. *Industrial and Labor relations Review*, 34, 219-233.
- Boster, F.J. (1990). An examination of the state of compliance-gaining message behavior research. In J. P. Dillard (Ed.), *Seeking compliance: The production of interpersonal influence messages* (pp. 7-20). Scottsdale, AZ: GSP.
- Boster, F.J., Kazoleas, D., Levine, T.R., Rogan, R., & Kang, K.H. (1995). The impact of power and message content on bargaining success. *Communication Reports*, 8, 136-144.
- Boster, F.J., & Levine, T.R. (1988). Individual differences and compliance-gaining message selection: The effects of verbal aggressiveness, argumentativeness, dogmatism, and negativism. *Communication Research Reports*, 5, 114-119.

- Boster, F.J., Levine, T., & Kazoleas, D. (1993). The impact of argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness on strategic diversity and persistence in compliance-gaining behavior. *Communication Quarterly*, 41, 405-414.
- Boster, F.J., & Lofthouse, L.J. (1986, November). *Situational and individual difference determinants of the persistence and content of compliance gaining behavior: A test of the generalizability of some compliance gaining message choice findings*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the international Communication association, Chicago, IL.
- Boster, F.J., & Stiff, J.B. (1984). Compliance-gaining message selection behavior. *Human Communication Research*, 10, 539-556.
- Burleson, B.R., Wilson, S.R., Waltman, M.S., Goering, E.M., Ely, T.K., & Whaley, B.B. (1988). Item desirability effects in compliance-gaining research: Seven studies documenting artifacts in the strategy selection procedure. *Human Communication Research*, 14, 429-486.
- Clark, R.A. (1979). The impact of self interest and desire for liking on the selection of communicative strategies. *Communication Monographs*, 46, 257-273.
- Clark, R.A., & Delia, J.G. (1976). The development of functional persuasive skills in childhood and early adolescence. *Child Development*, 47, 1008-1014.
- Cody, M.J., McLaughlin, M.L., & Jordan, W.J. (1980). A multidimensional scaling of three sets of compliance-gaining strategies. *Communication Quarterly*, 28, 34-46.
- Dahl, R.A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral Science*, 2, 201-218.
- Delia, J.G., Kline, S.L., & Burleson, B.R. (1979). The development of persuasive communication strategies in kindergartners through twelfth-graders. *Communication Monographs*, 46, 241-256.
- Deutsch, M., & Krauss, R. (1960). The effects of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 61, 181-189.
- Deutsch, M., & Krauss, R. (1962). Studies of interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6, 52-76.
- French, J.P.R., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.) *Studies in social power* (pp 150-167). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gouldner, A.W. (1962). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 161-178.
- Helm, B. Bonoma, T.V., & Tedeschi, J.T. (1972). Reciprocity for harm done. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 87, 89-98.
- Howard, J. A., Blumstein, P., & Schwartz, P. (1986). Sex, power, and influence tactics in intimate relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 102-109.
- Huston, T.L. (1983). Power. In H. H. Kelly, E. Berscheid, A. Christensen, J.H. Harvey, T.L. Huston, G. Levinger, E. McClintock, L.A. Peplau, & D.R. Peterson *Close relationships* (pp. 169-219). New York: W. H. Freeman.
- Instone, D., Major, B., & Bunker, B.B. (1983). Gender, self confidence, and social influence strategies: An Organizational simulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 44, 322-333.
- Johnson, P. (1976). Women and power: Toward a theory of effectiveness. *Journal of Social Issues*, 3, 99-110.
- Kearney, P., Plax, T.G., Richmond, V.P., & McCroskey, J.C. (1984). Power in the classroom IV: Alternatives to discipline. In R.N. Bostrum (Ed.) *Communication yearbook 8*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Kearney, P., Plax, T.G., Richmond, V.P., & McCroskey, J.C. (1985). Power in the classroom III: Teacher communication techniques and messages. *Communication Education*, 34, 19-28.
- Kelman, H.C. (1961). Processes of opinion change. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25, 57-78.
- Kipnis, D., Schmidt, S.D., & Wilkinson, I. (1980). Intraorganizational influence tactics: Explorations in getting one's way. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 65, 440-452.
- Krauss, R.M., & Deutsch, M. (1966). Communication in interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 4, 572-577.
- Levine, T.R., & Wheelless, L.R. (1990). Cross-situational consistency and use-nonuse tendencies in compliance-gaining tactic selections. *The Southern Communication Journal*, 56, 1-11.
- Marwell, G.M., & Schmitt, D.R. (1967). Dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior: An empirical analysis. *Sociometry*, 30, 350-328.
- Michener, H.A., & Suchner, R.W. (1972). The tactical use of social power. In J.T. Tedeschi (Ed.) *The social influence processes* (pp. 239-287). New York: Aldine Atherton.
- Michener, H.A., Vaske, J.J., Schleifer, S.L., Plazewski, J.G., & Chapman, L.J. (1975). Factors affecting concession rate and threat usage in bilateral conflict. *Sociometry*, 38, 62-80.
- Miller, G.R., Boster, F.J., Roloff, M.E., & Seibold, D.R. (1977). Compliance-gaining message strategies: A typology and some findings concerning the effects of situational differences. *Communication Monographs*, 44, 37-51.
- O'Keefe, B.J., & Shepherd, G.J. (1987). The pursuit of multiple objectives in face-to-face interaction: Effects of construct differentiation on message organization. *Communication Monographs*, 54, 396-419.
- O'Keefe, D.J. (1990). *Persuasion: Theory and research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Oskamp, S. (1971). Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and other mixed-motive games. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 15, 225-259.
- Scudder, J. (1986, November). *Power, threat use, and the formation of agreements: An alternative compliance gaining approach*. A paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Chicago, IL.
- Spowl, J.P., & Senk, M. (1986, April). *Sales communication: Compliance gaining strategy choice and sales success*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Communication Association, Atlantic City, NJ.

Stapleton, R.E., Nelson, B.L., Franconere, V.T., & Tedeschi, J.T. (1975). The effects of harm-doing on interpersonal attraction. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 96, 109–120.

Tedeschi, J.T., & Bonoma, T.V. (1972). Power and influence: An introduction. In J.T. Tedeschi (Ed.) *The social influence processes* (pp. 1–49). New York: Aldine Atherton.

Tedeschi, J.T., Schlenker, B.R., & Lindskold, S. (1972). The exercise of power and influence: The source of influence. In J.T. Tedeschi (Ed.) *The Social Influence Processes* (pp. 287–345). New York: Aldine Atherton.

Thibaut, J., & Kelly, H. (1959). *The psychology of groups*. New York: John Wiley.

Wheeless, L.R., Barraclough, R., & Stewart, R.A. (1983). Compliance-gaining and power in persuasion. In R.N. Bostrum (Ed.) *Communication yearbook 7* (pp. 105–145). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Youngs, G.A. (1986). Patterns of threat and punishment reciprocity in a conflict situation. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 541–546.

Appendix A
Values used for Power Manipulations

Cars used in each power condition

Prelude:	High Buyer/High Seller: Seller Poor Alt/Buyer poor alt
Jeep:	Low Buyer/Low Seller: Seller Good Alt/Buyer Good alt
Grand AM:	Low Buyer/High Seller: Seller Good Alt/Buyer poor alt
Corolla:	High Buyer/Low Seller: Seller Poor Alt/Buyer Good alt

Retail, wholesale, and alternative values for each car/condition

	Condition/Car			
	Prelude	Jeep	Grand-Am	Corolla
Retail (List)	6,400	4,900	6,900	7,800
Wholesale (Invoice)	5,300	3,800	5,800	6,700
Buyer alternative	6,075	4,175	6,575	7,075
Seller alternative	5,625	4,525	6,525	7,025

Buyer alt = Strong, retail – 725; Weak, Retail – 325; Seller alt = Strong, Wholesale + 725; Weak, Wholesale + 325.

Appendix B

Instructions

Today you will be playing the “used car sales” game. One person will be assigned the role of the buyer and one person will be given the role of seller. Obviously, the buyer wants to get the best deal (i.e., pay the least money) possible on his or her new used car, but the seller wants to make as much profit (sell the car for as much) as he/she can. The better you do at this game, the more extra-credit you can earn!

The game will be played for five rounds (six including practice), each with a different car up for sale. After a practice round, you will be given a series of five descriptions of cars (one at a time) which are to be bought and sold. Each car description will include the make and model of the car, its millage, and a description of its options (e.g., stereo, air conditioning etc.) You will also be given the retail and the wholesale price of the car. The retail price is the “asking” or “sticker” price. It includes the cost of the car plus seller profit. The wholesale price is the “seller’s cost” or “break even” point for the seller. The seller wants the buyer to pay the retail price but the buyer would like to buy the car at wholesale cost.

Buyer’s success is determined by how far the agreed upon price is below the retail price (i.e., retail minus price sold for). The farther the sales price is below retail, the better the buyer does (hence more extra credit!). Seller’s success is determined by how far above wholesale the sales price is (i.e., price sold for minus wholesale). The farther the sales price is above wholesale, the more profit is made by the seller and the better the seller will do in the game.

There is, however, a catch to this game. Each buyer and each seller will have an alternative offer. When a person really wants to buy a car, there is usually more than one person or dealership the person can buy from. The same is usually true for sellers; there is more than one possible buyer for each car. So, in order to make this game more realistic, each person will have an alternative offer. For the buyer, this is the price they could buy a comparable car for (from someone else). For the seller, this is the price another customer has offered to buy the car for. The buyer does not know the seller’s alternative and the seller does not know the buyer’s alternative. Either the buyer or the seller can take their alternative offer at any time. If one person takes their alternative, this forces the other to take their alternative as well. If one person takes their alternative in a given round, both the buyer’s and the seller’s success will be calculated on the basis of each’s alternatives.

In the game, the buyer and the seller will communicate by written messages. No talking please. The buyer will start by sending a message to the seller. The buyer and the seller will then alternate sending messages until (a) they agree upon a sales price, (b) an alternative offer is taken, forcing the other person to take their alternative, or (c) each have sent five messages. If, after each person has sent five messages an agreement has still not been reached, each will automatically take their alternative offer. Once a round has ended, the buyer and seller will move on to another car until all five cars have been bought and sold.

Appendix C
Information Provided on Car Cards

1985 Honda Prelude

- Si 2-Door Coupe	Retail (sticker) = \$6,400
- 65,000 Miles	Wholesale (Invoice) = \$5,300
- Air Conditioning	Buyer Alternative = \$6,075
- Power Steering	Seller Alternative = \$5,625
- AM/FM Cassette Stereo w/4 speakers	

1984 Jeep

- Laredo	Retail (sticker) = \$4,900
- 70,000 miles	Wholesale (Invoice) = \$3,800
- 4 wheel drive	Buyer Alternative = \$4,175
- 6 cyl. engine	Seller Alternative = \$4,525
- AM radio	

1988 Pontiac Grand-Am

- 2-Door Coupe	Retail (sticker) = 6,900
- 40,000 miles	Wholesale (Invoice) = 5,800
- Sunroof	Buyer Alternative = 6,575
- Stereo w/tape & CD	Seller alternative = 6,525
- Cruise control	
- Air Conditioning	
- Power Steering	

1989 Toyota Corolla

- 4-Door Sedan DX	Retail (sticker) = 7,800
- 17,000 miles	Wholesale (invoice) = 6,700
- Air conditioning	Buyer Alternative = 7,075
- Stereo Cassette	Seller Alternative = 7,025

Received: October 18, 2000
Accepted: December 20, 2000

